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| Model Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Cases Tried by the People's Courts in 2023 Published by the Supreme People's Court | | 最高人民法院发布2023年人民法院反垄断和反不正当竞争典型案例 |
| (September 14, 2023) | | （2023年9月14日） |
| Table of Contents | | 目录 |
| 1. Case involving a dispute over abusing a dominant position in the market in relation to the active pharmaceutical ingredient, desloratadine citrate disodium (No. 1140 [2020], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court)—properly handling the relationship between protection of intellectual property rights and anti-monopoly efforts | | 1.“枸地氯雷他定”原料药滥用市场支配地位纠纷案【最高人民法院（2020）最高法知民终1140号】——妥善处理知识产权保护与反垄断的关系 |
| 2. Case involving a dispute over refusal to deal in relation to "basic funeral services" (No. 242 [2021], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court)—determination of a public utility enterprise' refusal to deal and legal liability | | 2.“基本殡葬服务”拒绝交易纠纷案【最高人民法院（2021）最高法知民终242号】——公用企业拒绝交易行为的认定及法律责任承担 |
| 3. Case involving a vertical agreement dispute in relation to General Motors (No. 1137 [2020], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court)—allocation of the burden of proof and determination of liability for compensation in a civil action subsequent to an anti-monopoly action | | 3.“通用汽车”纵向垄断协议纠纷案【最高人民法院（2020）最高法知民终1137号】——反垄断后继民事诉讼中的举证责任分配及赔偿责任认定 |
| 4. Case of an anti-monopoly administrative penalty for a commercial ready-mix concrete joint venture (No. 29 [2023], Final, Administrative, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court)—determination of the implementation of a horizontal monopoly agreement | | 4.“商砼联营”反垄断行政处罚案【最高人民法院（2023）最高法知行终29号】——实施横向垄断协议的认定 |
| 5. Case of a jurisdiction objection over a dispute over refusal to deal in the active pharmaceutical ingredient, Batroxobin (No. 1136 [2022], First, Civil, 73, Beijing of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court)—determination of jurisdiction over a dispute over refusal to deal | | 5.“巴曲酶”原料药拒绝交易纠纷管辖权异议案【北京知识产权法院（2022）京73民初1136号】——拒绝交易纠纷的管辖确定 |
| 6. Case involving a counterfeit-based confusion dispute in relation to Siemens (No. 312 [2022], Final, Civil, SPC of the Supreme People's Court)—determination of counterfeit-based confusion | | 6.“西门子”仿冒混淆纠纷案【最高人民法院（2022）最高法民终312号】——仿冒混淆行为的认定 |
| 7. Case involving a know-how infringement dispute in relation to the general-purpose reagent for LICA (No. 1889 [2020], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court)—determination of technical solutions that constituted know-how | | 7.“光激化学发光分析系统通用液”技术秘密侵权纠纷案【最高人民法院（2020）最高法知民终1889号】——构成技术秘密的技术方案的认定 |
| 8. Case involving an unfair competition dispute in relation to the app Shuabao (No. 1011 [2021], Final, Civil, 73, Beijing of the Beijing Intellectual Property Court)—determination of data capture as an act of unfair competition | | 8.“刷宝APP”不正当竞争纠纷案【北京知识产权法院（2021）京73民终1011号】——数据抓取不正当竞争行为的认定 |
| 9. Case involving an unfair competition dispute in relation to the app Power Leveling Group (No. 13290 [2022], First, Civil, 0115, Shanghai of the Primary People's Court of Pudong New Area of Shanghai Municipality)—determination of power leveling as an act of unfair competition | | 9.“代练帮APP”不正当竞争纠纷案【上海市浦东新区人民法院（2022）沪0115民初13290号】——网络游戏商业代练不正当竞争行为的认定 |
| 10. Case involving an unfair competition dispute in relation to placing false purchase orders and manipulating credit ratings (No. 2585 [2022], First, Civil, 0309, Guangdong of the Primary People's Court of Longhua District of Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province)—determination of using false transactions for false advertising | | 10.“刷单炒信”不正当竞争纠纷案【广东省深圳市龙华区人民法院（2022）粤0309民初2585号】——利用虚假交易进行虚假宣传行为的认定 |
| 1. Case involving a dispute over abusing a dominant position in the market in relation to the active pharmaceutical ingredient, desloratadine citrate disodium—properly handling the relationship between protection of intellectual property rights and anti-monopoly efforts | | 1.“枸地氯雷他定”原料药滥用市场支配地位纠纷案——妥善处理知识产权保护与反垄断的关系 |
| [Case Number] No. 1140 [2020], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court (Guangzhou Hairui Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. of Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group and Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. v. Hefei Industrial Pharmaceutical Institute Co., Ltd., Hefei Enruite Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and Nanjing Hicin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (dispute over abusing a dominant position in the market)) | | 【案号】最高人民法院（2020）最高法知民终1140号〔扬子江药业集团广州海瑞药业有限公司、扬子江药业集团有限公司与合肥医工医药股份有限公司、合肥恩瑞特药业有限公司、南京海辰药业股份有限公司滥用市场支配地位纠纷案〕 |
| [Basic Facts] Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. and its subsidiary (collectively, "Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group") sued, alleging that they were the manufacturer of the allergy medicine, desloratadine citrate disodium tablets, under the brand name, Beixue; that Hefei Industrial Pharmaceutical Institute Co., Ltd., which owned relevant patent on desloratadine citrate disodium, and its subsidiary and affiliated companies (collectively, "HIPI") had long been the sole supplier of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), desloratadine citrate disodium, necessary for manufacturing Beixue; that in addition to the API, HIPI manufactured desloratadine citrate disodium capsules, HIPI supplied the API to Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group and competed with it to market the preparations; and that HIPI used its dominant position in the market in the API to restrict Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group so that it could only buy its API, significantly raise the API price, and force Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group to accept commercial arrangements unrelated to dealings in the API by threatening to stop supply, causing huge losses to Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group, HIPI abused its dominant position in the market by restricting dealings, unfairly high prices, tie-in sales, and imposing unreasonable conditions under the Anti-monopoly Law. Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group requested a judgment that HIPI stop the abuse and pay Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group 100 million yuan in compensation for its losses and reasonable expenses incurred for enforcing rights. The court of first instance held that HIPI abused its dominant position in the market by restricting dealings, unfairly high prices, and imposing unreasonable dealing conditions, and rendered a judgment that HIPI should immediately stop the above acts and pay Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group more than 68 million yuan in compensation. Both parties appealed. HIPI alleged that it neither had a dominant position in the relevant market nor abused such a position; it requested that the original judgment be reversed and that Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group's claims be dismissed. Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group alleged that the court of first instance had awarded too low compensation, and requested that the judgment be modified to award more than 78 million yuan in compensation. | | 【基本案情】扬子江药业集团有限公司及其子公司（合称扬子江方）起诉称，其系商品名为“贝雪”的抗过敏药物枸地氯雷他定片剂生产商。合肥医工医药股份有限公司拥有枸地氯雷他定有关专利，长期以来，该公司及其子公司、关联公司（合称医工方）是生产“贝雪”所必需的枸地氯雷他定原料药的唯一供应方。医工方除生产枸地氯雷他定原料药外，也生产枸地氯雷他定硬胶囊剂。因而，医工方与扬子江方既是涉案原料药的供需双方，也是涉案制剂的竞争双方。医工方利用其在涉案原料药市场的支配地位，限定扬子江方只能向其购买涉案原料药，大幅提高涉案原料药价格，以停止供应涉案原料药为要挟，强迫扬子江方接受与涉案原料药交易无关的其他商业安排，给扬子江方造成的巨大损失，构成反垄断法意义上的限定交易、不公平高价、搭售、附加不合理条件等滥用市场支配地位行为，请求判令医工方停止滥用市场支配地位行为，并赔偿扬子江方损失及维权合理开支1亿元。一审法院认为，医工方实施了限定交易、不公平高价、附加不合理交易条件等滥用市场支配地位行为，判决医工方立即停止上述行为并赔偿扬子江方6800余万元。双方均不服，提起上诉。医工方认为其在相关市场不具有支配地位，未实施滥用市场支配地位行为，请求撤销原判并依法驳回扬子江方的诉讼请求；扬子江方认为一审判赔数额过低，请求改判赔偿7800余万元。 |
| The Supreme People's Court held at second instance that although HIPI had established a dominant position in the Chinese market in the API, it faced strong indirect competition from the downstream second-generation antihistamine preparation market, which somewhat undermined its position and that existing evidence was insufficient to prove its abuse of the dominant position. First, desloratadine citrate disodium was under the protection of HIPI's patent. When HIPI restricted Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group so that it could buy the patented API only from HIPI within a certain period and scope, HIPI was legitimately exercising its patent rights. As the market foreclosure effect produced by the restriction did not exceed the legal scope of exclusiveness of the patent, the restriction was not a restriction on dealings without any justifiable reason. Second, based on the internal rate of return after the price increase and the proportionality between prices and economic value, the initial price of the patented API was likely to be a promotional price, and the price increase was likely to be a reasonable adjustment that restored the promotional price to a regular price. A price increase that was significantly higher than the cost increase alone was insufficient to determine an unfairly high price. Third, as existing evidence was insufficient to prove that HIPI expressed or implied a tying sale of an item unrelated to the case and the patented API, it was impossible to determine that there was imposition of unreasonable dealing conditions. The Supreme People's Court rendered a final judgment, reversing the first-instance judgment, dismissing Yangtze River Pharmaceutical Group's claims. | | 最高人民法院二审认为，医工方在中国境内的枸地氯雷他定原料药市场虽然具有市场支配地位，但因其面临来自下游第二代抗组胺药制剂市场的较强间接竞争约束，故其市场支配地位受到了一定程度的削弱，且现有证据难以证明其实施了滥用市场支配地位行为。一是枸地氯雷他定落入医工方专利权保护范围，医工方限定扬子江方在一定期限和范围内只能向其购买涉案专利原料药的行为系对专利权的正当行使，由此产生的市场封锁效果也并未超出专利的法定排他效力范围，不构成无正当理由限定交易的行为。二是综合考虑涨价后的内部收益率及价格与经济价值的匹配度，涉案专利原料药初始价格系促销性价格的可能性较大，后续涨价较大可能系对促销性价格向正常价格的合理调整，仅凭价格涨幅明显高于成本涨幅尚不足以认定不公平高价行为。三是现有证据尚不足以证明医工方存在将案外项目与涉案专利原料药销售作捆绑交易的明示或暗示，故难以认定存在附加不合理交易条件行为。最高人民法院终审判决，撤销一审判决，改判驳回扬子江方的诉讼请求。 |
| [Significance] This case, involving a monopoly on an API, specifies that in assessing an intermediate input operator's dominant position in the market, consideration shall be given to the indirect competition from a downstream market, the relevancy of the market foreclosure effect of the alleged restriction on dealings to the exercise of patent rights and methods for assessment, and determination and regulation of acts such as unfairly high prices and imposition of unreasonable trading conditions. This case made useful explorations into properly managing the relationship between patent protection and anti-monopoly efforts, taking into account the encouragement of innovation and protection of market competition, and assessing monopolistic conduct with the aid of economic analysis, and is significant for promoting the accurate application of the Anti-monopoly Law and effectively safeguarding fair competition in the pharmaceutical market. | | 【典型意义】本案系涉原料药领域垄断案件，明确了判断中间投入品经营者市场支配地位时对来自下游市场的间接竞争约束的考量、被诉限定交易行为的市场封锁效果与专利权行使的关联性和判断方法、不公平高价及附加不合理交易条件等行为认定和规制的基本考虑。该案在妥善处理专利权保护与反垄断的关系，兼顾鼓励创新与保护市场竞争，善用经济分析辅助判断垄断行为等方面作出了有益探索，对于促进反垄断法的准确适用，有力维护药品市场公平竞争具有积极意义。 |
| 2. Case involving a dispute over refusal to deal in relation to "basic funeral services"—determination of a public utility enterprise' refusal to deal and legal liability | | 2.“基本殡葬服务”拒绝交易纠纷案——公用企业拒绝交易行为的认定及法律责任承担 |
| [Case Number] No. 242 [2021], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court (Quanzhou Licheng Lisheng Funeral Service Co., Ltd. v. Quanzhou Jiying Funeral Service Co., Ltd. (dispute over refusal to deal)) | | 【案号】最高人民法院（2021）最高法知民终242号〔泉州鲤城立升殡仪服务有限公司与泉州市集英殡仪服务有限公司拒绝交易纠纷案〕 |
| [Basic Facts] Quanzhou Licheng Lisheng Funeral Service Co., Ltd. (Lisheng Funeral Service) was mainly engaged in funeral intermediary services. It sued Quanzhou Jiying Funeral Service Co., Ltd. (Jiying Funeral Service), alleging that Jiying Funeral Service was a public utility enterprise providing cremation and basic funeral services and that because Lisheng Funeral Service complained about Jiying Funeral Service's illegal charges, Jiying Funeral Service refused Lisheng Funeral Service's application for cremation on behalf of relatives of the deceased, in violation of the Anti-monopoly Law's prohibition of administrative monopoly. Lisheng Funeral Service requested a judgment that Jiying Funeral Service should be ordered to resume handling related business with Lisheng Funeral Service and pay it 80,000 yuan in compensation for economic losses. The court of first instance held that Lisheng Funeral Service failed to prove that Jiying Funeral Service was an entity exercising the administrative monopoly regulated by the Anti-monopoly Law, and rendered a judgment to dismiss all the claims of Lisheng Funeral Service. Lisheng Funeral Service appealed, alleging that Jiying Funeral Service's refusal to deal was an abuse of its dominant market position prohibited by the Anti-monopoly Law. | | 【基本案情】泉州鲤城立升殡仪服务有限公司（简称立升公司）主要从事殡仪中介服务，其起诉主张泉州市集英殡仪服务有限公司（简称集英公司）系提供遗体火化等基本殡葬服务的公用企业，因立升公司举报集英公司违规收费，集英公司拒绝立升公司代死者亲属申办遗体火化业务，违反了反垄断法禁止行政性垄断的规定，请求判令集英公司恢复为立升公司办理相关业务并赔偿经济损失8万元。一审法院认为，立升公司未证明集英公司为反垄断法所规制的行政垄断的实施主体，判决驳回立升公司的全部诉请。立升公司不服，提起上诉，主张集英公司的拒绝行为属于反垄断法所禁止的滥用市场支配地位的拒绝交易行为。 |
| The Supreme People's Court held at second instance that the basic funeral service market in which Jiying Funeral Service operated was an upstream market and that Lisheng Funeral Service provided funeral intermediary services that were derived from basic funeral services, and operated in a downstream market, funeral intermediary service market. The alleged monopolistic conduct occurred in the basic funeral service market and also had an impact on the funeral intermediary service market. Jiying Funeral Service was a public utility enterprise in an exclusive position in the basic funeral service market in downtown Quanzhou. The basic funeral services it provided were specific services essential for Lisheng Funeral Service to perform funeral intermediary services, and there were no alternative services for Lisheng Funeral Service. Jiying Funeral Service's refusal to handle the relevant business for Lisheng Funeral Service caused Lisheng Funeral Service to be excluded from the funeral agency service market in downtown Quanzhou, excluded and limited competition in the funeral agency service market, and damaged the interests of the deceased's relatives as consumers under the Anti-monopoly Law, and constituted refusal to deal prohibited by the law. Since its establishment, Lisheng Funeral Service had been engaged in funeral intermediary services and long and stably dealt with basic funeral service providers; restoring the original dealings was not to impose any dealing obligations. The Supreme People's Court rendered a final judgment, reversing the first-instance judgment, ordering Jiying Funeral Service to resume handling Lisheng Funeral Service's application for cremation business on behalf of the relatives of the deceased according to relevant laws, regulations, and industry management standards, determining at its discretion that Jiying Funeral Service should pay 80,000 yuan to Lisheng Funeral Service for the loss caused by refusal to deal, based on the nature, extent, circumstances, and duration of the refusal, thereby fully upholding Lisheng Funeral Service's claim for compensation. | | 最高人民法院二审认为，集英公司所处的基本殡葬服务市场属于上游市场，立升公司提供的殡仪中介服务系由基本殡葬服务衍生而来，其所处的殡仪中介服务市场属于下游市场。被诉垄断行为发生于基本殡葬服务市场，同时对殡仪中介服务市场产生影响。集英公司作为在泉州市中心市区基本殡葬服务市场具有独占地位的公用企业，其提供的基本殡葬服务是立升公司开展殡仪中介服务不可或缺的特定服务，且立升公司没有替代选择。集英公司拒绝为立升公司办理相关业务，导致立升公司被彻底排除在泉州市中心市区的殡仪中介服务市场之外，排除、限制了殡仪中介服务市场的竞争，损害了作为反垄断法意义上消费者的死者亲属的利益，构成反垄断法所禁止的拒绝交易行为。立升公司自成立后一直从事殡仪中介服务，与基本殡葬服务提供者之间存在长期、稳定的交易关系，恢复原有交易并非强加交易义务。最高人民法院终审判决，撤销一审判决，改判集英公司在符合相关法律、法规规定和行业管理规范的条件下恢复立升公司代死者亲属申办遗体火化业务；同时根据集英公司拒绝交易行为的性质、程度、情节、持续时间，酌定集英公司赔偿因其拒绝交易行为给立升公司造成的损失8万元，全额支持了立升公司的赔偿诉讼请求。 |
| [Significance] This case specifies that if a public utility enterprise in an exclusive position is the only provider of specific services that are essential for the party dealing with it to carry out production and business activities, the impact of the refusal to deal on the competition in the downstream and upstream markets and whether the refusal damages the interests of consumers shall be comprehensively assessed when the anti-competitive effect of the refusal is assessed. This case also explored the remedies for refusal to deal and the criteria for determining losses caused by it. The adjudication on this case has positive significance for protecting basic people's livelihood, regulating competition in the funeral service market, and preventing and stopping monopolistic conduct by public utility enterprises in an exclusive position. | | 【典型意义】本案明确了具有独占地位的公用企业，如果是交易相对人开展生产经营活动不可或缺的特定服务的唯一提供者，判断其拒绝交易行为的反竞争效果时应综合评判对上下游市场竞争的影响，以及是否损害消费者的利益。同时，本案对拒绝交易行为的救济措施以及拒绝交易行为造成损失的认定标准进行了探索。本案裁判对保障基本民生，规范殡葬行业的市场竞争秩序，预防和制止具有独占地位的公用企业实施垄断行为具有积极意义。 |
| 3. Case involving a vertical agreement dispute in relation to General Motors—allocation of the burden of proof and determination of liability for compensation in a civil action subsequent to an anti-monopoly action | | 3.“通用汽车”纵向垄断协议纠纷案——反垄断后继民事诉讼中的举证责任分配及赔偿责任认定 |
| [Case Number] No. 1137 [2020], Final, Civil, IP, SPC of the Supreme People's Court (Miao [REDACTED] v. SAIC General Motors Sales Co., Ltd. and Shanghai Yilong Automobile Sales and Service Co., Ltd.(vertical agreement dispute)) | | 【案号】最高人民法院（2020）最高法知民终1137号〔缪某与上汽通用汽车销售有限公司、上海逸隆汽车销售服务有限公司纵向垄断协议纠纷案〕 |
| ．．．．．． | | 【基本案情】上海逸隆汽车销售服务有限公司（简称逸隆公司）系上汽通用汽车销售有限公司（简称通用公司）上海地区经销商之一。2014年，缪某从逸隆公司购买涉案车辆。2016年，上海市物价局作出处罚决定书，认定在2014年分销汽车过程中，通用公司存在与上海地区经销商达成并实施限定向第三人转售商品最低价格垄断协议的事实，责令其立即停止违法行为，并处以上一年度销售额4%的罚款。缪某认为，其在2014年从逸隆公司处购买涉案车辆时，正是通用公司实施上述纵向垄断协议期间，且购买价格也是涉案处罚决定认定的垄断价格，其合法权益受到了涉案垄断行为的侵害，故提起诉讼，请求判令通用公司赔偿其购车损失1万元及维权合理开支7500元，逸隆公司对上述损失承担补充赔偿责任。一审法院认为，在案证据尚不足以证明通用公司最低限价对逸隆公司具有拘束力，不足以认定通用公司与逸隆公司实施了限定向第三人转售商品最低价格的垄断协议，判决驳回缪某的诉讼请求。缪某不服，提起上诉。 |
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